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Abstract
This paper presents an empirical study of the effects of urban growth controls on the 
intercity commuting of workers. Growth controls (land use regulations that attempt 
to restrict population growth and urban sprawl) have increased housing prices and 
diverted population growth to uncontrolled cities. It has been suggested that resulting 
changes in local labour supply might stimulate intercity commuting from uncontrolled 
to controlled cities. To test this hypothesis, a gravity model of commuting flows between 
places in California is estimated using alternative econometric methods (OLS, Heckman 
selection and count-data). The possibility of spatial dependence in commuting flows 
is also taken into consideration. Results suggest larger commuting flows to destination 
places that restrict residential growth.
The widespread adoption of UGC has 
prompted many studies on this issue. Fischel 
(1990) reviews earlier empirical evidence 
that UGC raise housing prices. Brueckner 
(1990) and Engle et al. (1992) show how UGC 
can theoretically increase housing prices by 
reducing future negative externalities from 
population growth. Brueckner (1995) and 
Helsley and Strange (1995) present alterna-
tive models where housing price increases 
because the adoption of UGC by one or more 
cities restricts the supply of developable land 
in the region. Population growth diverted to 
neighbouring places increases the demand 
for land there, but ultimately raises land rents 
everywhere in the region due competition for 
1. Introduction
Many jurisdictions in the US have adopted 
land use regulations to restrict population 
growth and urban sprawl. These regulations, 
known as urban growth controls (UGC), 
have been advocated to prevent problems 
from excessive population growth and urban 
sprawl like greater congestion in the use of 
government-provided services and infra-
structure, loss of open space and pollution. 
In the US, UGC have been adopted in areas 
that have experienced fast population growth 
like California, Portland-OR, Boston-MA, 
New York-NY, Boulder-CO, New Jersey, 
Maryland, etc.
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land by mobile households. Levine (1999) 
provides empirical evidence that UGC causes 
housing supply displacement.
Because population growth is diverted 
from controlled to uncontrolled cities, Ogura 
(2005) suggests that theoretically UGC could 
induce workers to live in an uncontrolled city 
but to work in the controlled one. Vermeulen 
and Rouwendal (2008) also consider inter-
city commuting (IC) in a model of UGC, 
but with the restricting assumption that all 
jobs in the region are located in the central 
city, so that UGC there necessarily leads to 
IC. On the empirical side, however, there is 
no rigorous study on this issue. In a related 
work, Cervero (1989) finds that jobs– housing 
mismatches in the California Bay Area in 
1980 are partially explained by restricted 
supply of housing. His study, however, lacks 
a direct measure of residential restriction, 
employing the proportion of land area zoned 
for residential use as a proxy. Aivalotis et al. 
(2001) also report jobs–housing mismatches 
in the San Francisco Bay Area, suggesting 
that newcomers are induced to commute 
to work from homes in the outskirts due to 
lack of housing available in interior areas. 
There is also anecdotal evidence that UGC 
stimulate IC. For instance, Kelley and Rabin 
(2006) suggest in a news article that UGC in 
Santa Barbara have induced high traffic of 
commuters on roads that connect the city 
to nearby places where housing supply is 
less restricted. Therefore, existent empirical 
evidence suggests that UGC divert traffic 
growth from local roads to intercity roads. 
Aivalotis et al. (2001) add that longer inter-
city commuting increases overall pollution 
and loss of labour productivity. Because the 
effects of UGC and of commuting on society 
are important policy issues, it is important 
to reach a better understanding of how UGC 
impact IC.
The work presented here attempts to 
provide a rigorous analysis of the effects of 
UGC on IC. To do so, a gravity model of IC 
flows between California cities is estimated, 
controlling for distance, number of workers 
in the home place, job availability in the 
work place and other characteristics of the 
places involved, including the adoption of 
UGC by the work place. Data on place-to-
place commuting flows are obtained from 
the US Census Bureau (1990a), while UGC 
indicators are based on data from the 1989 
survey of growth-control practices adopted 
by jurisdictions in the state of California 
conducted by Glickfeld and Levine (1992). 
As a proxy for the stringency of residential 
growth controls, an index is computed 
taking into consideration the number of 
different types of residential regulations 
existent in each place. The justification for 
the use of this index is that jurisdictions 
should adopt more types of regulations if 
they want to make it harder for developers to 
produce more housing (similar growth con-
trol indexes were used by Brueckner (1998) 
and Levine (1999) to test other hypotheses). 
In the estimation of IC flows, however, one 
of the problems is the existence of large 
numbers of  zero-valued observations, 
requiring the use of alternative estimation 
methods (Heckman selection and count-
data models are employed for this purpose). 
Moreover, the empirical analysis also takes 
into account the possibility of  spatial 
dependence between IC flows. Overall, the 
results of the estimations indicate greater 
IC flow when the destination place adopts 
residential growth control measures.
A possible implication of this result is that 
UGC increase overall commuting costs. It is 
not completely clear, however, whether this 
increase in commuting is socially inefficient. 
While greater commuting directly hurts work-
ers and businesses, UGC are adopted to avoid 
negative externalities from excessive develop-
ment, thus the net effect on society’s welfare 
can be ambiguous.1 On the other hand, if 
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UGC are adopted without co-ordination by 
local jurisdictions, it is likely that regulations 
can become too strict because negative effects 
on workers and firms in neighbouring places 
are not considered (Glaeser et al., 2006, and 
Glaeser, 2007, suggest the need for regional 
co-ordination to avoid excessive construction 
regulations).
The remainder of this paper is organised as 
follows. The next section discusses Ogura’s 
(2005) model of how UGC might affect 
IC. Section 3 presents an empirical analysis 
of this issue based on the estimation of IC 
flows. Concluding remarks are presented in 
section 4.
2. Theoretical Analysis
Ogura (2005) presents a theoretical analysis 
of the relationship between UGC adoption 
and IC of workers. On one hand, his model 
suggests that the adoption of UGC depends 
on how price elastic the local labour supply 
is, which is affected by how easily commut-
ing from other places can occur. On the 
other hand, the model also shows that UGC 
might eventually stimulate the intensity of IC 
between close cities. In the model, IC emerges 
solely due to the adoption of UGC—i.e. other 
factors are ignored. In practice, however, 
Hamilton (1982) notes that jobs–housing 
mismatches are expected due to the existence 
of households composed of couples who 
work in different areas and to the higher fre-
quency of job turnover relative to residential 
mobility. Moreover, White (1988) suggests 
that workers belonging to minority groups 
may face restricted housing choices due to 
discrimination, thus having to incur greater 
commuting. While these and other factors 
are not considered in the theoretical model, 
they are included in the empirical analysis 
presented in this paper.
A simplified version of Ogura’s (2005) 
model is presented next. Because the objective 
of this paper is to test whether UGC affect 
IC, the model presented here focuses on this 
relationship.
2.1 Setup
Consider a closed economy with two regions 
indexed by i = 0, 1. There is a linear city in 
each region, with width one and length x– i. 
The central business district (CBD), where 
production takes place, is located at one of 
the extremes of the city. Thus, the length 
of the city corresponds to the distance 
between the boundary of the urban area 
and the CBD. The distance between the 
CBDs of the two cities is D. Urban land is 
occupied by mobile renters, who demand 
one unit of land each. Thus,  –xi equals the 
city population Pi and  –x0 +  –x1 = P0 +P1 = P, 
where P is the total population of workers 
in this economy.
Renters also consume a numeraire private 
good with income obtained from the sup-
ply of labour (one unit is supplied by each 
renter), which is exchanged for a wage wj, 
where j denotes the city of work. In order 
to work in the CBD of her own city, a renter 
residing at a distance xi from the CBD incurs 
a commuting cost txi, where t represents 
the commuting cost per unit of distance. 
However, if she is employed in the CBD of 
the other city, she incurs an additional cost 
tD. This setting implies that every renter in 
one city would incur the same additional 
commuting cost if she decided to work in 
the other city.2
The land rent paid by a renter residing at xi 
is ri(xi), which is a decreasing function of xi 
because individuals are willing to bid more 
to live closer to their work place in order to 
avoid commuting. In equilibrium, land rents 
offset all utility differentials related to where 
individuals live, equalising renters’ utilities 
everywhere. To simplify, assume that util-
ity is derived from the consumption of the 
numeraire private good. Thus, the indirect 
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utility function of a renter who lives in city 
i and works in city j can be written as
ui;jðxiÞ ¼ wi  txi  riðxiÞ if j ¼ iwj  tD txi  riðxiÞ otherwise

 
(1)
Landownership in each region is shared 
among absentee landowners.3 To avoid deal-
ing with conflict of interests, assume that each 
landowner receives rents from only one of the 
regions. Normalising non-urban land rent to 
zero, total land rent in each region (denoted 
by R) equals Ri xið Þ ¼
Zxi
0
riðxiÞdxi. Regions 
are symmetrical in all aspects, except that 
landowners are politically dominant only in 
one of the cities, adopting UGC to maximise 
total land rents R.4
Last, production in each city follows the 
aggregate function F(Ni), where Ni is the 
number of workers in city i, with F'(Ni) > 0  and 
F"(Ni) < 0 (i.e. production exhibits decreasing 
returns to labour). In addition,  F(0) = 0 and 
F'(0) = +∞. Therefore, in equilibrium, profit 
maximisation by competitive firms implies
    wi = F'(Ni) (2)
resulting in positive total profits. To simplify, 
assume that profits are shared among absentee 
firm-owners, who are neither workers nor 
landowners.5
2.2 Effects of UGC
To understand how the adoption of UGC 
affects this economy, consider first the case 
without controls. Then, there are three equi-
librium conditions. First, land rent at the 
boundary of each city must equal the oppor-
tunity cost of land outside the city, which was 
assumed to be zero—i.e. ri ( –xi) = 0. Secondly, 
rents at other places in city i are determined 
by utility equalisation: ui,h ( xi) = ui,h( –xi) for all 
xi and for any h ∈ {i, j}. Consequently
  riðxiÞ ¼ t xi  xið Þ (3)
which implies that land rent offsets the 
commuting cost differential with respect to 
the boundary resident in the city. Thirdly, 
utility must be equalised across cities due 
to free mobility. Thus, the following equal-
ity must hold in equilibrium: u0,0 ( –x0) = u1,1 
( –x1). Substituting (2), (3) and the population 
constraint  –x1 = (P –  –x0) in (1), the utility 
equalisation condition becomes F'(N0) – t –x0 
= F'(P – N0) – t(P –  –x0) which is satisfied 
when –x0 = 1/2 P ; that is, with a symmetrical 
population distribution and no IC of work-
ers.6 Intuitively, symmetrical population and 
production are optimal because regions are 
symmetrical in their geographical and eco-
nomic characteristics and production exhibits 
decreasing returns to labour.
Now, turn to the case where one city, say city 
0, adopts UGC (i.e.  –x0 is restricted below 1/2 P). 
Since growth in city 1 is uncontrolled, the land 
rent function (3) still applies to that city. City 0’s 
land rent function is, however, affected. Recall 
that residents must be equally well-off every-
where and suppose for the moment that IC does 
not occur, meaning that the first expression in (1) 
is valid. Noting that  u1,1 ( –x1) = w1 – t –x1 and setting 
this expression equal to u0,0(x0) = w0 – tx0 – r0(x0), 
the resulting land rent function for city 0 is
    r0(x0) = t( –x1 –  x0) + w0 – w1 (4)
In words, this function implies that land 
rents in the controlled city offset two util-
ity differentials: t( –x1 –  x0) is the commuting 
cost differential with respect to the boundary 
resident in city 1 and w0 – w1 represents the 
wage differential between cities. Then, note 
that when stricter UGC are adopted ( –x0 is 
reduced), both differentials go up at interior 
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locations of the controlled city. The commut-
ing cost differential increases because city 1’s 
size  –x1 is expanded as population growth is 
relocated to that city. The wage advantage 
for workers in city 0 widens because the local 
labour supply in the city is restricted relative 
to city 1.
The effects of UGC on land rents in each 
city are illustrated in Figure 1. In the figure, 
note that the slopes of the land rent curves 
are -t because the decrease in land rent due 
to greater distance is determined by the addi-
tional commuting cost t. As UGC become 
stricter, city 0’s size is reduced from  –x0 to  –x0
' 
and rents in city 0 increase for the two reasons 
mentioned earlier. Areas B and B1 depict the 
increase in land rents in each city due to the 
higher demand for land in city 1 (city 1’s size 
expands from  –x0 to  –x0
'). Area C represents the 
gain in land rents in city 0 due to the widened 
wage advantage. There is also a boundary 
rent loss (represented by area A) because the 
number of renters in city 0 is reduced by the 
stricter UGC. The rent loss ensures that there 
is an optimal stringency of UGC.
Consider now the possibility of IC. Then, local 
labour supply becomes more elastic as long 
as the wage differential between cities is high 
enough to cover the cost of IC (which equals 
tD in the model), making it advantageous for 
 workers to live in one place and work in the 
other. As UGC become stricter, the wage differ-
ential widens, but only until IC starts to occur. 
At that point, inflow of commuters from the 
nearby city offsets further population restriction 
in the controlled place.7 Formally, once IC starts, 
the equilibrium size of the controlled city’s 
workforce N^0 is determined by the equilibrium 
equality of the wage differential between cities 
to the IC cost—i.e.
    F'(Nˆ0) – F'(P–Nˆ0) = tD (5)
Since the number of workers remains fixed at 
N^0 as long as IC occurs, the number of outside 
workers commuting to the controlled place 
increases with the stringency of growth con-
trols. In other words, the adoption of stricter 
UGC increases IC flows of workers.
Notice that condition (5) implies that 
dN
dD
˘
0 0< . Consequently, the magnitude of 
IC flow (given by N^0  x0) decreases with D, 
holding the strictness of UGC fixed. In other 
words, the greater the distance between cities, 
the smaller is the IC flow.8
Last, recall that the stringency of UGC 
in this model is chosen to maximise land 
rents only. In practice, the adoption of UGC 
is determined by additional factors like 
Figure  1.    Change in land rents due to growth controls.
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 environmental quality. Moreover, landown-
ers’ share of political power varies across 
cities. Because both renters and firm-owners 
tend to lose under stricter controls, these 
groups should oppose UGC, leading to dif-
ferent stringency levels depending on the 
distribution of political power (Brueckner, 
1999, presents a UGC model where politi-
cal power is shared among landowners and 
renters). In any case, because cities are dif-
ferent in practice, UGC strictness differs 
across places. Accordingly, the empirical 
analysis presented next takes the intensity 
of UGC as given. Then, noting that the 
local labour supply N^0 is determined by D, 
the theoretical implication to be tested is 
that, when controlled for distance between 
cities and for other characteristics of the 
cities involved, IC flow increases with the 
stringency of UGC adopted in the destina-
tion place.
3. Empirical Model
According to the theoretical model, IC from 
the residence place i to the work place j should 
be positively affected by the stringency of 
UGC measures that restrict labour supply in 
the destination place j. To test this hypothesis, 
IC flows are estimated using an origin–des-
tination gravity model. The conventional 
gravity model for spatial interaction is speci-
fied in analogy to Newton’s law of gravity 
(see Batten and Boyce, 1986). In its simplest 
form, the model predicts that spatial interac-
tions are negatively affected by distance and 
positively related to the gravitational masses 
of the interacting places. In the case of IC 
flows, workers commute for employment, so 
that the gravitation mass of the origin place 
must be the number of workers while the mass 
of the destination place is the number of jobs 
available. Of course, other characteristics of 
each place may reinforce or restrain spatial 
interaction (other control variables used in 
the estimation are discussed later).
The following linearised version of the grav-
ity model is used to estimate IC flows9
    
lnðICijÞ ¼ βd lnðdijÞ þ βMi lnðMiÞ þ βMj lnðMjÞ
¼
XS
s¼1
βsi lnðXsiÞ þ
XV
v¼1
βvj lnðXvjÞ þ εij  
lnðICijÞ ¼ βd lnðdijÞ þ βMi lnðMiÞ þ βMj lnðMjÞ
¼
XS
s¼1
βsi lnðXsiÞ þ
XV
v¼1
βvj lnðXvjÞ þ εij
   
lnðICijÞ ¼ βd lnðdijÞ þ βMi lnðMiÞ þ βMj lnðMjÞ
¼
XS
s¼1
βsi lnðXsiÞ þ
XV
v¼1
βvj lnðXvjÞ þ εij
                    
lnðICijÞ ¼ βd lnðdijÞ þ βMi lnðMiÞ þ βMj lnðMjÞ
¼
XS
s¼1
βsi lnðXsiÞ þ
XV
v¼1
βvj lnðXvjÞ þ εij
       (6)
where ICij represents the intensity of the com-
muting flow of workers from place i to place 
j; dij is the distance between cities; Mi is the 
gravitational mass of place i (represented by 
i’s labour force); and Mj is the gravitational 
mass of place j (represented by j’s job avail-
ability). Variables Xsi and Xvj are respectively 
characteristics of place i and place j that might 
affect IC between places. As usual, βs are the 
parameters of the model and εij is the unex-
plained residual.
To test the hypothesis that UGC stimulate 
IC flows, a variable for the presence or inten-
sity of UGC is included as one of the char-
acteristics of place j, with a positive expected 
estimated coefficient.
Other characteristics of places i and j 
included in model (6) are factors that should 
impact workers’ willingness to commute 
between places: unemployment, ethnicity, 
income, education, age, gender, marital status, 
homeownership, occupation and density. Two 
dummy variables are also included: the first 
for origin and destination places located in 
the same county and the second for destina-
tion places that are attractive job centres. 
These additional factors are discussed in the 
Appendix, including comments on expected 
and estimated effects.
3.1 Data
Information about UGC measures adopted 
by each jurisdiction is drawn from the 1989 
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survey conducted by Glickfeld and Levine 
(1992). The survey (answered by local pub-
lic officials) consisted of a questionnaire on 
the types of land use restrictions existent in 
each jurisdiction at the end of 1988 approxi-
mately.10 For the purposes of this work, only 
regulations that should greatly affect local 
labour supply are considered—i.e. regula-
tions that restrict housing construction. 
Table 1 summarises the frequency of adop-
tion of the types of regulations considered. 
While adoption of regulations does not 
imply enforcement, it is plausible that there 
is a positive correlation between a greater 
number of regulations and how concerned 
the jurisdiction is about restricting growth 
(this view is suggested by Glickfeld and 
Levine, 1992). Accordingly, the stringency 
of growth controls can be measured through 
an index that counts the number of different 
types of residential regulations adopted in 
each place based on the list of types in Table 
1.11 The resulting index is denoted hc and 
can vary from 0 to 3. Alternatively, a dummy 
variable dhc is created, taking value one when 
the jurisdiction adopted at least one type of 
residential regulation (true for 41 per cent 
of jurisdictions in the sample that answered 
the survey).
For IC patterns, journey-to-work flows 
between places in California are obtained 
from the 1990 Census Transportation 
Planning Package (CTPP) assembled by the 
US Census Bureau (1990a). The intensity of 
IC from residence place i to the work place 
j is measured by the flow of workers who 
commute from i to j, denoted by ICij. In the 
original dataset, there are 668 places with 
population over 2500 in 1990, while other 
places are categorised as ‘remainder of the 
county’ areas. In the estimations, only flows 
between the 668 identified places are con-
sidered (excluded flows represent 21.63 per 
cent of all workers who commute between 
Californian cities). Moreover, the CTPP does 
not report eventual flows to or from other 
states. The final sample used in the estima-
tions also disregards flows to places for which 
there was no information on UGC (that was 
the case for 310 of the 668 places identified 
in the CTPP; IC flows to these 310 places 
represent 17.01 per cent of the total flows 
between the 668 places).
Additional geographical and socioeconomic 
characteristics of the 668 places were obtained 
from the 1990 Decennial Census (US Census 
Bureau, 1990b, 1990c).
Table 2 presents all variables used in the 
empirical work. Descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 3. Besides ICij, hc and dhc, 
which were discussed before, all other vari-
ables listed in Tables 2 and 3 are used as con-
trol variables in the estimations.12
3.2 Methodology
The gravity model (6) is first estimated 
using the ordinary least square (OLS) 
method.13 One problem, however, is that 
ICij equals zero too often (91.4 per cent of 
the observations in the final sample used are 
zero-valued). To deal with this issue, several 
approaches are suggested in the literature. 
Table 1.    Growth controls and percentage of jurisdictions adopting them
Type of measure Percentagea
Restriction on the number of residential building permits 11.17
Housing infrastructure requirements for new residential development 29.32
Urban limit line beyond which development is not permitted 14.80
a Proportions refer to the 358 jurisdictions in the sample that provided information through the growth 
control survey. The sum is not 100 per cent because some jurisdictions did not adopt measures, while 
others adopted more than one type of measure.
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The simplest one just ignores zero-valued 
observations. Taking this procedure as a 
first attempt, relevant results are presented 
in Table 4. Results are in accordance with 
theoretical expectations, but further discus-
sion will be left to the next sub-section when 
results based on other estimation methods 
will be compared.
Another simple alternative suggested is 
to replace zero values by a small ad hoc 
number, but neither this nor the procedure 
of ignoring zero-valued observations is 
satisfactory because information is either 
dismissed or altered (Linders and de Groot, 
2006, discuss these procedures in the case 
of trade flows).
In cases where the lack of spatial interaction 
between places might be caused by a selection 
process, the use of a sample selection model is 
recommended. Linders and de Groot (2006) 
and Helpman et al. (2008) apply this method 
to estimate trade flows. A brief explanation of 
this approach is presented next. First, consider 
the regression equation
 yh ¼ xh0βþ µh (7)
where, y is the dependent variable; x is the vec-
tor of covariates; β is the vector of parameters 
of the model; and µ is the vector of errors.
In the case of IC flows, this equation can be 
rewritten as model (6). Suppose that yh in (7) 
is observed only under a selection condition 
determined by the equation
 s

h ¼ zh0γ þ eh (8)
However, only the sign of the selection vari-
able sh can be observed. Hence, taking sh = 1 
if sh > 0 and 0 otherwise, the dependent vari-
able in the regression model (7) is observed 
Table 2.    Description of variables
Variable Descriptiona
ICij	 Number of workers commuting from place i to the work place j, from CTPP
hc	 Index of intensity of residential growth controls, 1988
dhc	 Dummy variable, value 1 if hc>0
distanceij	 Distance between geographical centres of residence i and work place j
labourforce	 Labour force, in thousand workers
jobs	 Employees, in thousand workers, based on CTPP data
unemployrt	 Total labour force 16 years and over, percentage unemployed
minoritypc	 Population by origin, percentage non-Hispanic Black or Hispanic
age25pc	 Population by age, percentage under 25 years
age45pc	 Population by age, percentage 45 years and over
marriedpc	 Persons 18 years and over, percentage married
homeownerpc	 Housing units, percentage owner-occupied
femalepc	 Civilian labour force, percentage female
bapc	 Persons 25 years and over, percentage with bachelor’s degree or higher
income	 Median household income
tradepc	 Labour force, percentage working in trade industry
manufpc	 Labour force, percentage working in manufacture industry
area	 Land area in square kilometres (1 square km ≈ 0.39 square mile)
D_county	 Dummy variable, value 1 if residence place i is in the same county as 
 work place j
D_jobcentre	 Dummy variable, value 1 if jobs > 50 or jobs/labourforce >1.5
a Observations are for 1990 and refer to the residence place, unless otherwise noted.
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only if sh = 1(in the case of IC flows, a possible 
interpretation is that a strictly positive flow 
between places only happens if, for instance, 
there is an easy way to commute between 
these places). If µh and eh are correlated, the 
OLS method becomes inadequate to esti-
mate the regression model. One option is to 
estimate both the selection and the regres-
sion equations together using the maximum 
likelihood method. An easier way is to follow 
the two-step estimation procedure called 
Heckit, named after Heckman’s (1976, 1979) 
seminal works. The first step is to estimate the 
probability that sh > 0 using the probit method 
(i.e. estimateProbðsh ¼ 1Þ ¼ ðzh0γÞ, where 
8 is the normal c.d.f.) and then to use the 
result to compute the corresponding inverse 
Mills ratio for each observation (the ratio 
is given by λ^h ¼ φðγ^zhÞ=ðγ^zhÞ, where φ 
is the normal p.d.f.). In the second step, 
the OLS method can be used to regress yh 
on xh and λ^h. It is typically suggested that 
the selection model should also include an 
exclusion restriction—i.e. a variable that 
helps to determine the selection process, but 
not the outcome.14 The problem is to find a 
restriction variable that satisfies this require-
ment. In the case of IC flows, the restriction 
variable must affect the likelihood of a strictly 
positive IC flow, but not the intensity of the 
flow. A justification for such a variable might 
be that there is a maximum commuting cost 
that workers are willing to incur. In practice, 
however, factors that affect this threshold IC 
cost are likely also to affect the intensity of 
IC because individual workers have hetero-
geneous threshold IC costs (thus, as the cost 
increases, fewer and fewer workers commute, 
until the threshold is reached). Nonetheless, 
the estimations suggest that the variable 
unemployrtj (unemployment in the work 
place j) satisfies the restriction requirement—
i.e. unemployrtj is statistically significant in 
the first-step Probit estimation, but not in 
the second-step estimation—thus allowing 
us to exclude it from the regression model. 
Table 3.    Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum
ICij 445 556 14.3 275.2 0 45 321
hc 358 0.6 0.8 0 3
dhc 358 0.4 0.5 0 1
distanceij 445 556 223.6 152.6 0.6 789.8
labourforce 668 18 338.7 71 790.1 423 1 622 423
jobs 668 18 278.4 82 555.5 1 1 831 531
unemployrt 668 7.0 4.5 0.4 33.9
minoritypc 668 27.6 24.0 2.4 98.5
age25pc 668 36.8 8.5 7.7 82.4
age45pc 668 29.9 9.8 0.9 80.7
marriedpc 668 56.0 10.3 10.5 88.3
homeownerpc 668 58.1 16.1 0.7 93.8
femalepc 668 43.2 3.8 11.7 51.4
income 668 37 897.1 16 008.5 14 215 130 734
bapc 668 21.7 15.4 0.7 90.9
tradepc 668 21.1 3.7 7.6 39.3
manufpc 668 14.9 7.7 1.6 41.7
area 668 31.2 70.5 1.1 1 215.6
D_county 445 556 0.1 0.2 0 1
D_jobcentre 668 0.1 0.3 0 1
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Results from Heckit estimations are presented 
in Table 4. Note that the inverse mills ratio 
(λ^) is statistically significant, indicating that 
the error terms in the selection equation are 
in fact correlated to error terms in the regres-
sion equation. While the results for the UGC 
variables are in accordance with theoretical 
expectations, comparison with the results 
of other estimations is presented in the next 
sub-section.
For comparison, a third method will be 
used to estimate IC flows. Because an IC 
flow is the number of workers commut-
ing between places, count data estimation 
methods might be appropriate. For instance, 
Flowerdew and Aitkin (1982) estimate 
migration flows with a Poisson model, while 
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) use that model to 
estimate trade flows. In the current work, IC 
flows are estimated using the zero-inflated 
negative binomial (ZINB) model because of 
the large variance relative to the mean (the 
Poisson distribution requires that variance 
equals the mean) and the large number of 
zero-valued observations. Results based on 
the ZINB model are presented in Table 4. 
In the table, ln(α) gives the natural log of 
the dispersion parameter α of the count 
model, which is statistically different from 
zero, indicating that the ZINB model is 
more appropriate than the Poisson model 
(see Stata, 2008). The Vuong test statistic 
(Vuong, 1989) shows that the zero-inflated 
model is better than the standard negative 
binomial model (the null hypothesis is 
that the standard model is appropriate; see 
Stata, 2008). As shown in the table, results 
from this method are qualitatively similar 
to the others. Quantitative comparison is 
discussed next.
3.3 Results
Results from the OLS, Heckit and ZINB esti-
mations are presented in Table 4. Standard 
errors presented there are robust White 
standard errors, employed to correct for 
heteroscedasticity. Specifications in columns 
(1), (3) and (5) include hcj as the growth 
control variable, while specifications in (2), 
(4) and (6) include dhcj. OLS results are in 
columns (1) and (2), Heckit results are in 
columns (3) and (4), and ZINB results are in 
columns (5) and (6).
The estimated coefficients of distanceij, 
labourforcei and jobsj are similar in the OLS 
and ZINB estimations, but approximately 1.5 
times greater in the Heckit estimations. 
Regarding the growth control variables hcj 
and dhcj, estimated coefficients are much 
larger in the ZINB estimations, while Heckit 
estimates indicate smaller effects. Most 
importantly, however, these estimates are 
positive and statistically significant in all 
estimations. Therefore, places that adopt 
stricter UGC attract relatively more IC work-
ers. Although it is not the concern of this 
work, the following quantitative effects can 
be noted: a one-unit increase in the hcj index 
stimulates the flow of intercity commuters 
by 7.6–13.7 per cent depending on the 
method used; in addition, the existence of 
residential growth controls, measured by the 
dummy variable dhcj, increases IC flows by 
7 per cent to 18.9 per cent. Social welfare 
effects are hard to evaluate as they depend on 
which groups of workers are more affected, 
mode of transport, negative externalities 
from increased commuting, etc. Attempts to 
study welfare effects will be left for future 
research.
Results for other explanatory variables 
included in the estimations are generally con-
sistent with expected effects, thus supporting 
the proposed empirical model. Those results 
are discussed in the Appendix.
One potential problem with the empirical 
analysis presented so far is that there might 
be spatial correlation between flows from 
neighbouring origin or neighbouring desti-
nation places. If that is the case, estimation 
of IC flows must be controlled for spatial 
dependence. The next sub-section discusses 
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how spatial autocorrelation is tested and 
taken into account. Heckit estimations will 
be used for this purpose (OLS and ZINB 
methods were used before for the sake of 
comparison only).
3.4 Spatial Autocorrelation
Spatial dependence between observations 
is common when there are spillover effects. 
For instance, property crime is likely to be 
spatially correlated across neighbouring 
areas because criminals are mobile (Anselin, 
1988). Local public expenditure and taxation 
also experience spatial dependence (see Case 
et al., 1993; Revelli, 2002; and Mattos and 
Rocha, 2008).
In the case of spatial interactions, LeSage 
and Pace (2005) discuss empirical mod-
els that take spatial autocorrelation into 
account, using them to estimate migration 
flows across US states. Based on the two 
simplest empirical models suggested by 
them, which can be implemented with the 
statistical software Geoda™, Figure 2 depicts 
the patterns of spatial autocorrelation tested 
here. Diagram (a) depicts the case where all 
commuting flows from place i to places in 
the neighbourhood of j are considered to 
be correlated with the flow from i to j—i.e. 
there is destination-based spatial dependence 
(DSD). Diagram (b) presents the case where 
all flows from the neighbourhood of place i 
with destination to place j are considered to be 
correlated with the flow from i to j—i.e. there 
is origin-based spatial dependence (OSD). 
The neighbourhood definition adopted here 
is ad hoc: jurisdictions are considered to be 
neighbours if their geographical centres are 
less than 15 miles (24 km) apart. Under this 
definition, the average number of neighbours 
in the sample is 20 (the median is 12, with 
22 places having no neighbours). For the 
sake of robustness, estimations were also 
performed with thresholds of 10 or 20 miles, 
without changes in the relevant results.15 An 
alternative neighbourhood definition com-
monly suggested in the spatial econometrics 
literature is based on the existence of com-
mon borders, but that might be inadequate 
here due to the incomplete sample and the 
existence of unincorporated areas between 
jurisdictions.
Two main types of spatial autocorrelation 
are discussed in the spatial econometrics 
literature: spatial lag dependence and spatial 
error dependence. An overview of these types 
of autocorrelation is presented next (for fur-
ther details, see Anselin, 1988, 2005). In the 
spatial lag case, each observation is directly 
correlated to neighbouring observations. In 
the spatial error case, the error term is cor-
related with error terms of the estimations of 
neighbouring observations (the assumption 
is that unmodelled effects spill over across 
observations, resulting in spatially correlated 
errors).
Formally, the spatial lag model can be writ-
ten as
Figure 2.    Spatial patterns of autocorrelation.
(a) destination-based spatial
dependence (DSD)
(b) origin-based spatial
dependence (OSD)
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     y = ρwy + Xβ + u  (9)
where, y is the vector of origin-destination 
independent variables; w is the spatial weight 
matrix (to be explained soon); X is the matrix 
of other explanatory variables; and u repre-
sents the vector of i.i.d. error terms; ρ and β 
give the estimated parameters.
In the DSD case, when the flow from place 
i to j is estimated, the weight matrix w produces 
the weighted average of IC flows originated in 
i with destination to places in the neighbour-
hood of j. In the OSD case, w produces the 
weighted average of flows destined to place 
j that are originated in the neighbourhood 
of i. The weight matrix is computed so that 
neighbours’ influences are standardised, with 
equal weight for each neighbour (for instance, 
if place i has two neighbours, each neighbour’s 
weight is 0.5; thus, the sum of weights in each 
row of w is one).
The spatial error model can be formally 
represented by a system of two equations
       y = Xβ + u  (10)
      u = δwu + v (11)
where, the first equation is the regression model 
to be estimated and the second represents the 
residual autocorrelation process; δ denotes the 
autocorrelation parameter and v is a vector 
of i.i.d. error terms; w is the weight matrix 
computed as before.
To assess whether IC flows are subject to 
spatial dependence, diagnostic tests are per-
formed for the regression model of the Heckit 
estimation method.16 Resulting statistics are 
presented in Table 5 (spatial diagnostic tests 
and estimations are performed using Geoda™; 
for further discussion on the interpretation of 
tests and estimation results, see Anselin, 1988, 
2005). The first two columns in the table show 
tests for DSD, while remaining columns show 
tests for OSD. Note that Moran’s I scores are 
statistically significant (the null hypothesis of 
zero score indicates absence of spatial auto-
correlation). However, Moran’s I test detects 
misspecification in general (not only spatial 
autocorrelation), thus not indicating which 
alternative model should be used. To this 
end, Lagrange multiplier (LM) test statistics 
are helpful. The LM-lag and Robust LM-lag 
test statistics assume spatial lag models as 
alternatives, while the LM-error and Robust 
LM-error test statistics take spatial error mod-
els as alternatives. All LM statistics reported in 
Table 5 are significant. High significance rein-
forces the view of spatial dependence between 
IC flows. When tests for both spatial lag and 
spatial error models reject the null hypothesis, 
Anselin (2005) suggests the selection of the 
Table 5.    Diagnostics for spatial dependence: statistics for second-step heckit estimations 
(dependent variable: lnICij)
 DSDa OSDb
 (hcj) (dhcj) (hcj) (dhcj)
Moran’s I score 0.274 0.275 0.270 0.271
Moran’s I z-value 69.9*** 70.3*** 76.5*** 76.9***
LM-lag 1494.1*** 1499.4*** 2619.6*** 2630.1***
Robust LM-lag 54.1*** 51.3*** 234.7*** 230.9***
LM-error 4837.1*** 4899.2*** 5787.5*** 5841.0***
Robust LM-error 3397.0*** 3451.2*** 3402.6*** 3441.8***
aDSD: destination spatial dependence.
bOSD: origin spatial dependence.
Notes: LM test statistics are distributed as χ2 with one degree of freedom. ***, ** and * indicate 1, 5 and 
10 per cent significance levels respectively.
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model that produces the largest test statistic 
value, although misspecification might be 
due to other reasons. According to such an 
approach, spatial error models are appropri-
ate. Alternatively, Revelli (2002) and Mattos 
and Rocha (2008) compare the log-likelihood 
in the estimation of lag and error models, 
although doing so also provides support for 
the spatial error model. For comparison, 
estimation results for both the spatial lag 
and spatial error models are presented (in 
Table 6).
In Table 6, first notice that the inverse Mills 
ratio ( λ^) is statistically significant in all esti-
mations, justifying the use of the selection 
model. Secondly, both the spatial lag and 
spatial error variables (Wy and Wu) are sta-
tistically significant, reinforcing the results of 
previous diagnostic tests that suggest spatial 
dependence in IC flows. Thirdly, estimates for 
the variables distanceij, labourforcei and jobsj 
are not very different relative to the non-spa-
tial estimations (shown in columns (3) and 
(4) of Table 4). Finally, regarding the estimates 
for the growth control variables hcj and dhcj, 
coefficients remain positive and statistically 
significant as theoretically expected, but the 
magnitude of the coefficients is smaller com-
pared with the non-spatial estimations. For 
instance, according to the DSD-error model, 
a one unit increase in the hcj variable has a 
3.2 per cent impact on IC flows, much lower 
than the 7.6 per cent impact suggested by the 
non-spatial Heckit model.
In summary, results of estimations that 
take into consideration spatial dependence 
still suggest that UGC stimulate greater IC 
flows, although estimated effects are smaller 
compared with results from non-spatial 
estimations.
4. Concluding Remarks
This work attempts to analyse empirically 
how the adoption of urban growth controls 
(UGC), a policy that has become widespread 
in fast-growing areas, has affected the inter-
city commuting (IC) of workers. To do so, a 
gravity model of IC flows between California 
places in 1990 is estimated with a measure 
of UGC included as one of the explanatory 
variables. Because of the large proportion of 
zero-valued IC observations, the two-step 
Heckman selection method is used (a count-
data method is also employed alternatively). 
Moreover, spatial dependence in IC flows is 
taken into account.
Regardless of the estimation method used 
in this work, results indicate greater IC flows 
to places with stricter residential controls, 
supporting the hypothesis that UGC induce 
jobs–housing mismatches. A possible implica-
tion of this result is that UGC make overall 
commuting longer and therefore more costly. 
This does not necessarily imply that there is 
inefficient commuting because controls are 
originally adopted by local governments to 
improve communities and in the long-run 
households and firms should try to move 
around to adjust to UGC. However, distor-
tions from longer commuting (for example, 
more congestion on intercity roads and 
increased overall pollution and loss of worker 
productivity) are likely to be socially inef-
ficient because UGC are typically imposed 
by local jurisdictions without considering 
the location of workers and firms in nearby 
places, thus restricting residential develop-
ment where it might be socially optimal in 
the regional point of view. Market-oriented 
policies like development fees are often pro-
posed as better alternatives to UGC, but when 
UGC adoption is unavoidable it should pay 
regard to the effects on commuting patterns 
and on workers and firms in neighbouring 
communities.
For future research, updated data on land 
use regulations in California might allow the 
exploration of changes in the effects of UGC 
on commuting since 1990 (as people and 
firms relocate over time and in face of increas-
ing housing demand). Local governments 
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might also be interested in knowing which 
commuting areas have been more affected by 
UGC (this would require to look at smaller 
geographical units like census tracts or traf-
fic analysis zones). Also, studying individual 
commuting data might allow one to assess 
whether commuting patterns of different 
groups of people have been affected differ-
ently by UGC.
Notes
 1. Excessive commuting has been discussed 
before in a different context by Hamilton 
(1982, 1989), White (1988), Cropper and 
Gordon (1991), Small and Song (1992) 
and others. Their studies generally find 
that commuting costs are not minimised 
when considering actual employment and 
residential locations or locations assumed in 
the monocentric city model. However, these 
works cannot answer whether commuting 
patterns are optimal because locations chosen 
by workers and firms are not only based on 
employment. The adoption of UGC might 
be one of the other factors that determine 
location choices, thus leading to longer com-
muting patterns.
 2. This setting keeps the analysis simple, 
restricted to the case of a monocentric city 
with identical individuals.
 3. An extension with resident landowners shows 
that the effects of UGC on IC are similar com-
pared with the absentee landowners’ case (see 
Ogura, 2005).
 4. In practice, UGC has been advocated for other 
reasons, but since land rents offset utility 
advantages across locations, maximisation 
of land rents implies that the total pre-rent 
utility advantage obtained by local residents 
is maximised.
 5. Ogura (2005) extends the model by consid-
ering the case where landowners and firm-
owners share political power. Because labour 
supply restriction reduces profits, the optimal 
population size tends to be greater, but the way 
UGC affects IC is analogous compared with 
the basic model.
 6. Symmetrical population allocation is also the 
social optimum because total surplus in this 
economy equals production minus commut-
ing costs, which are both optimised at the 
symmetrical allocation.
 7. Note that the wage differential stops increasing 
because everybody in the nearby city has the 
same IC cost (tD). If this cost was heterogene-
ous, the wage advantage would have to keep 
increasing to attract additional workers.
 8. Ogura’s (2005) model goes further and shows 
that, when IC happens in equilibrium, the 
optimal strictness of UGC decreases with 
distance (i.e. dx0=dD > 0). This happens 
as greater distance implies higher IC costs, 
which are incorporated into land rents in 
the controlled place because the equilibrium 
wage advantage is determined by the IC 
cost. Higher land rents everywhere in the 
city imply greater marginal rent losses from 
tighter UGC and, therefore, less incentive for 
stricter controls. Hence, dðN^0  x0Þ=dD< 0; 
i.e. the equilibrium IC flow decreases with 
distance when UGC are adopted.
 9. This version is called the ‘unconstrained’ grav-
ity model. In the regional science and urban 
transport literatures on commuting flows the 
‘doubly constrained’ specification is more 
commonly used instead (see, for instance, 
Batten and Boyce, 1986). The doubly con-
strained model includes constraints that force 
the aggregate flow from each origin to equal 
the number of workers commuting from there 
and the aggregate flow to each destination to 
equal the number of workers commuting to 
that place. While this constrained specification 
should generally produce better statistical fit 
and forecast ability, the statistical methodol-
ogy required is more complex. Because the 
purpose of this work is simply to test the 
significance of the effects of growth controls 
on IC flows, the simpler unconstrained speci-
fication is used (this also facilitates the use of 
alternative econometric methods to address 
other problems). In the context of popula-
tion migration estimation, the unconstrained 
specification is used, for instance, by LeSage 
and Pace (2005) and Ashby (2007). In the 
trade literature, the use of the unconstrained 
model is still standard.
10. While the data might seem outdated, this is 
the only publicly available source that has a 
comprehensive coverage of UGC  measures 
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adopted by jurisdictions in a large area. Other 
surveys are restricted to smaller areas or to 
regulations adopted during a restricted period. 
For instance, the study by the Pioneer Institute 
for Public Policy Research and Rappaport 
Institute for Greater Boston (2005) is restricted 
to places in eastern Massachusetts and the 
1998 survey conducted by the California 
Department of Housing and Community 
Development (2000) is restricted to regula-
tions adopted between 1995 and July 1998 in 
California.
11. Measures calculated in analogous ways were 
used by Brueckner (1998) to study strategic 
adoption of UGC by jurisdictions and by 
Levine (1999) to examine the displacement 
of housing production.
12. The values for jobs and D_jobcentre are under-
estimated if places received workers from 
other states. This problem arises because jobs 
was computed based on intrastate place-to-
place commuting flows reported in the 1990 
CTPP for the state of California. The extent 
of the impact of this limitation on estimation 
results is likely to be small, however, because 
counties bordering other states had only 10.79 
per cent of the state population in 1990.
13. For the variable jobs, there are a few observa-
tions with zero values, which were replaced by 
1 to avoid losing these observations in the log 
transformation process.
14. Further discussion on the Heckman selection 
model and on the need for a selection restric-
tion will be found in any modern economet-
rics textbook. For instance, see Wooldridge 
(2006, pp. 618–620).
15. These additional results are available upon 
request.
16. Spatial dependence in the first step (selection 
model) of the Heckit estimation method is 
difficult to take into consideration because 
estimation of spatial Probit models is cum-
bersome with the current available statistical 
programmes.
17. An anonymous referee noticed that it might 
be redundant to include D_county in the 
estimations because distance (included 
through the variable lndistanceij) should be 
better able to capture labour market integra-
tion. D_county is kept in the final estimations 
because it exhibits strong statistical signifi-
cance and its exclusion does not change the 
qualitative results (as expected, the size of the 
coefficient of lndistanceij is slightly reduced 
when D_county is included. Results for esti-
mations without D_county are available upon 
request.
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Appendix. Other Control 
Variables
As explained in section 3, besides distance, 
labour force, job availability and a vari-
able related to UGC, additional explanatory 
variables are included in the estimations 
of IC flows. The additional variables are 
measures of unemployment (unemployrt), 
population ethnicity (minoritypc), age dis-
tribution (age25pc and age45pc), median 
household income (income), homeownership 
rate (homeownerpc), marriage rate (mar-
riedpc), gender (femalepc), college education 
rate (bapc), occupation of resident workers 
(manufpc and tradepc) and land area (area). 
Two dummy variables were also included: one 
for IC flows with origin and destination in 
the same county (D_county) and another for 
flows destined to job centres (D_jobcentrej). 
For exact definitions of these variables and 
descriptive statistics, refer to Tables 2 and 3. 
Expected and estimated effects of those vari-
ables are discussed next (estimated parameters 
are not presented here due to space con-
straints, but are available upon request). In the 
following discussion, the suffix i refers to the 
residence place while j refers to the work place.
First, the unemployment rate is included to 
capture the difficulty in finding jobs. Hence, 
unemployrti should have a positive impact 
on IC flows while unemployrtj should have 
a  negative impact, holding everything else 
constant. Estimation results, however, indicate 
that the latter has no impact on the intensity 
of IC flows, although it positively affects the 
probability that IC occurs (recall, from section 
3, that for this reason unemployrtj is used as the 
exclusion restriction in the Heckit estimations).
Demographic characteristics should also be 
relevant because workers differ in their will-
ingness to commute longer distances. First, 
workers belonging to minority groups tend to 
cluster in residency due to housing discrimi-
nation (see Cutler et al., 1999, for a study of 
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the formation of ghettos) or preferences (see 
Gonzales, 1998, for a study of Mexican neigh-
bourhoods). Thus, job–housing mismatches 
should be more likely for these workers. (This 
effect is suggested by White, 1988, in the study 
of excessive commuting.) On the other hand, 
if minority workers are clustered and poor, 
they may not be able to afford commuting 
to other places (this is the spatial mismatch 
hypothesis; see Gobillon et al., 2007, for 
a recent review of the literature). In fact, 
estimations indicate that both minorityi and 
minorityj negatively affect IC.
Clustering based on income is also com-
mon (for instance, poorer households cannot 
afford better neighbourhoods, thus becoming 
trapped in bad areas). Accordingly, IC flows 
should be greater between places with high 
incomei and incomej. Estimation results con-
firm this prediction.
Matching job and housing locations should 
be particularly difficult for married workers 
and homeowners. Married workers are con-
strained by the locational needs of the spouse. 
For homeowners, homeownership implies 
high moving costs, preventing them from 
moving close to work as they change jobs.  (For 
example, Hamilton, 1982, suggests these effects 
in his study of excessive commuting by work-
ers.) Indeed, results confirm that marriedpc 
and homeownerpc (for both the origin and the 
destination places) positively impact IC flows.
On the other hand, lower mobility of work-
ers in certain age-groups should negatively 
affect IC flows. Older workers are more likely 
to be professionally established (with less 
frequent job changes and thus residing closer 
to work). Moreover, workers with children 
should prefer to commute less far due to 
greater need to be closely available during 
the day. Younger workers should also work 
closer to home because their skills are not 
specialised, they do not earn much to afford 
longer commuting and many of them might 
be part-time students (with high opportunity 
cost of commuting time). Therefore, IC flows 
should be smaller between places with larger 
age25pci, age25pcj, age45pci and age45pcj, 
which is confirmed by the results.
Female workers might also prefer shorter 
journeys because of their greater household 
responsibilities. (Lee and McDonald, 2003, 
present a literature review and an empirical 
assessment on this hypothesis.) Hence, fema-
lepci and femalepcj should have negative esti-
mated coefficients. Results, however, indicate 
that femalepcj has a positive effect, although 
not always significant. One possibility is that 
a larger proportion of female workers in a 
place must be complemented by male work-
ers from other cities because women are not 
always perfect substitutes for male workers.
Educated workers should also want to avoid 
IC due to the high marginal opportunity cost 
of commuting time. On the other hand, they 
might be clustered for services that are bet-
ter able to satisfy their needs (school quality 
for their children, for instance), implying 
longer commuting. Education also indicates 
specialised skill, implying that educated 
workers might need to commute more to 
find jobs that match their skills. Estimations 
indicate that IC flows are larger from places 
with greater bapci and to places with smaller 
bapcj, although estimates for the latter were 
not always statistically significant. These 
results suggest that educated workers com-
mute more often between cities, with places 
that have fewer of such workers demanding 
more of them from outside.
Effects are harder to predict for the explana-
tory variables related to job occupation. A 
large proportion of workers in the same 
sector could imply that there are activities 
in these sectors nearby, although it might 
be in neighbouring places. Because the two 
activities that employ the largest proportions 
of workers are trade and manufacture, the 
proportions of resident workers in these 
sectors are included in the estimations. 
Results indicate that IC flows are smaller 
when the residence and work places have 
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a large proportion of manufacture workers 
(manufpc), suggesting that workers in this 
sector live closer to where they work than 
workers in other sectors. However, in the case 
of trade workers, flows are greater from places 
with a high proportion (high tradepci) or to 
places with a low proportion (low tradepcj). 
A possible explanation is that trade activities 
exist in most places, but not exclusively, thus 
requiring that trade workers need to find jobs 
elsewhere if there is a surplus, commuting to 
places where trade workers are scarcer.
The geographical variables added have more 
predictable effects. Land area is included as a 
proxy for density of workers and jobs. Greater 
area (lower density) should make it harder 
for jobs–housing matches to occur, inducing 
greater IC flows. In fact, both areai and areaj 
have positive and significant coefficients. Last, 
the effects captured by the two geographical 
dummies are obvious. Flows between places 
in the same county are likely to be greater 
due to better transport and greater economic 
integration, while a large availability of jobs or 
a high jobs-to-workers ratio should increase 
flows to such places. In fact, both D_county 
and D_jobcentrej have large positive estimated 
coefficients.17
In summary, results for the additional 
control variables do not contradict economic 
intuition, thus supporting the empirical 
model adopted.
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